Why did the US change its mind on Ukraine firing missiles into Russia? And will it impact the war?
- Written by Jon Richardson, Visiting Fellow, Centre for European Studies, Australian National University
The lifting of US restrictions on the use of ATACMS ballistic missiles by Ukraine may help it repel Russian forces trying to retake Russian territory seized by Ukraine earlier this year. It could also strengthen Ukraine’s hand ahead of US President-elect Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House in January.
It may, however, be another case of too little, too late in Western support for Ukraine.
This week, the Biden Administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US-supplied missiles known as ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile Systems). ATACMS have a range of around 300 kilometres. Previously, the US has told Ukraine only to use them against Russian forces on Ukrainian territory.
This has been a source of huge frustration to Ukraine, particularly as it could not use them against bases inside Russia that have launched ceaseless missile and drone assaults on Ukrainian cities.
Russian attacks on Ukraine in October killed[1] 183 civilians and wounded another 903, according to the UN.
Precise details of the change in US policy have not been announced publicly. The New York Times[2] reports that permission to hit Russian territory will only apply initially to attacking Russian forces massing in the Kursk region.
Russia wants to recapture more than 500 square kilometres of territory captured by Ukraine in a bold thrust in August. Western agencies believe the 50,000 troops massing[3] on the Russian side include several thousand North Korean soldiers.
North Korea’s involvement may be the main reason prompting the removal of limits on the ATACMS. Apart from strengthening Ukraine’s chances of keeping its foothold inside Russian territory, the move may also discourage North Korea from sending more troops.
The North Korean presence also provides some justification for the US decision, allaying concerns it could be framed by Russia as an escalation.
Careful decision-making by the West
Fears of escalation and the possibility of direct conflict between Russia and NATO have been a major reason for the US caution thus far.
This has been fuelled in part by Russian nuclear sabre-rattling[4]. Russian President Vladimir Putin upped the ante in September, warning that allowing Western weapons to hit Russia would constitute NATO’s “direct participation” in the war.
Russia claims[5], apparently without foundation, that such weapons need Western crews to man them. Russia also claims[6] the missiles may require Western intelligence to ensure accurate targeting.
The Kremlin has reacted predictably to the US announcement this week, saying it would add “fuel to the fire[7]” of the war.
However, ATACMS have already been used against Russian targets inside Ukrainian sovereign territory, notably in Crimea, which Moscow illegally annexed a decade ago.
Some Biden administration sources have told the media that fears of retaliation via sabotage also have shaped its wariness about allowing ATACMS to hit Russia. Russian intelligence services have mounted a substantial sabotage campaign[8] in Europe during the past year.
Aversion to such risk has been evident from the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Western countries have shown concern at every step about crossing Putin’s supposed “red lines”.
They initially baulked at supplying different types of equipment – be it tanks, fighter jets, short-range missiles or long-range missiles. They then put restrictions on where and how they could be used.
Will it help Ukraine?
The US restrictions on using ATACMS led Britain and France to place similar limits on Ukraine’s use of Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles, which have a range of 250 kilometres. It seems likely the US move will now enable the UK and France to follow suit in relaxing those limits.
Another boost to Ukraine’s arsenal could come from Germany, where the Greens, Social Democrats and the opposition Christian Democrats support green-lighting delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, which have a range of 500 kilometres.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz has to date blocked it[9], but elections are now scheduled for February.
Washington officials have recently claimed that ATACMS would now be of limited use because Russia has moved much of its key weaponry, particularly jet fighters, outside their range.
However, some military analysts[10] believe there are still plenty of military targets within range, perhaps numbering in the hundreds.
These include command and communications posts, logistics hubs, arms depots, missile units and helicopter detachments. Moving equipment further back from the front lines would make life difficult for Russian operations, stretching their supply lines and adding to the time for air support to arrive.
Russia’s support has grown
Allowing a sovereign state that’s been illegally invaded to use weapons against military targets inside the aggressor country is hardly escalatory.
Moreover, as US-based Russian scholar Sergei Radchenko[11] points out, it would be extremely risky for Russia, which has so woefully underperformed on the battlefield in Ukraine, to attack NATO in response.
Russian warnings about escalation seem even more preposterous given the huge amount of weaponry and ammunition Russia has received from its own supporters, even before the entry of North Korean soldiers.
North Korea has sold Russia hundreds of ballistic missiles and millions of rounds of ammunition. And it is now reportedly supplying Russia with self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launchers[12].
Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of Shahed drones, drone production technology, ammunition and short-range missiles.
And China sells Russia around US$300 million[13] (A$460 million) each month in dual-use equipment necessary for weapons production, from machine tools to microchips. Russia may even have set up a military drone factory[14] in China.
What could Trump’s arrival mean?
The Biden White House may further reduce restrictions on using ATACMS inside Russia, for example, allow their use beyond the Kursk region, in an effort to leave Ukraine in as strong a position as possible before Trump takes office.
Some Ukrainians fear Trump may cut support for Ukraine in his effort to end the war quickly. However, others believe[15] Trump may be just as helpful as the Biden administration, given the latter’s caution, and the need for Trump to be seen as a credible dealmaker[16], rather than selling Ukraine down the river.
Some in Trump’s new team, notably incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, have spoken, albeit equivocally, of using the prospect of more robust support for Ukraine[17] as leverage in pushing Putin to negotiate.
But optimism on this score must be offset by the strong presence in his new Cabinet and inner circle of those who have been strong critics of aid to Ukraine or even downright apologists for Russia.
There is also a strong chance the Trump administration could rescind the decision to lift the restrictions on ATACMS use.
References
- ^ killed (www.forbes.com)
- ^ The New York Times (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ 50,000 troops massing (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ nuclear sabre-rattling (theconversation.com)
- ^ claims (www.bbc.com)
- ^ claims (abcnews.go.com)
- ^ fuel to the fire (apnews.com)
- ^ sabotage campaign (www.aspistrategist.org.au)
- ^ blocked it (www.dw.com)
- ^ some military analysts (www.understandingwar.org)
- ^ Sergei Radchenko (www.spectator.co.uk)
- ^ self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launchers (www.ft.com)
- ^ US$300 million (carnegieendowment.org)
- ^ military drone factory (www.reuters.com)
- ^ believe (www.dw.com)
- ^ credible dealmaker (www.washingtonpost.com)
- ^ using the prospect of more robust support for Ukraine (www.economist.com)
