Australian troops are already in the Middle East. What would a wider Iran conflict mean for the ADF?

Australia has not sent troops to invade Iran, nor has the federal government announced that the country has joined an offensive war.

Australian Defence Force personnel are nevertheless operating in the Middle East, where the distinction between defensive assistance and direct involvement can become increasingly difficult to maintain as hostilities escalate.

An Australian E-7A Wedgetail surveillance aircraft and supporting ADF personnel were deployed to the United Arab Emirates in March to help Gulf countries detect and defend themselves against Iranian missiles and drones.

The government described the deployment as defensive military assistance rather than offensive action against Iran.

By June, Defence reported that the Australian aircraft had flown more than 40 missions over the Gulf and had helped identify incoming missiles and drones before they could strike regional countries.

That makes Australia more than a distant observer.

It also raises an important question: what would happen to the Australian mission if the conflict between Iran, the United States and regional countries continued to widen?

Why Australian personnel are in the Middle East

Australia has maintained a Defence presence in the Middle East for many years.

The ADF operates a regional headquarters and support facilities that assist Australian military operations, communications and logistics across the area. The base at Al Minhad in the United Arab Emirates has served as an important hub for Australian activities throughout the region.

The more recent Wedgetail deployment has a specific defensive purpose.

The aircraft is an airborne early-warning and control platform. Its radar systems can monitor a large area, detect aircraft, missiles and drones, and provide information to other forces responsible for intercepting those threats.

It does not need to fire a weapon to become an important part of a military operation.

Information can be as valuable as ammunition in modern warfare.

Defensive does not mean risk-free

The government has repeatedly emphasised that Australia is not conducting offensive strikes against Iran.

That distinction matters.

There is a clear difference between helping protect a Gulf country from an incoming missile and participating in an attack on Iranian territory.

However, defensive military operations are not without danger.

Australian personnel may operate from bases or facilities that could themselves become targets. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to attack military installations and countries hosting American or allied forces across the Gulf. Recent Iranian retaliation has reportedly included attacks directed at facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan.

An Australian aircraft assisting the defence of those countries could therefore be exposed to the consequences of a conflict even when Australia has no intention of attacking Iran.

The risk is not theoretical.

Defence personnel may face missile alerts, drone threats, disrupted airspace and the possibility that the bases supporting their operations will be targeted.

When does defensive assistance become participation?

This is the difficult question.

A surveillance aircraft that detects an incoming Iranian missile and helps a Gulf country intercept it is performing a defensive function.

But the same technology may be capable of identifying aircraft, ships or military movements that could also be useful in offensive operations.

The government has said that Australia’s aircraft will not support offensive action. Questions have nevertheless been raised about how that operational boundary would be maintained if regional partners were simultaneously conducting defensive and offensive missions.

The distinction may depend on:

• What information Australian personnel collect.
• Who receives that information.
• How quickly it is passed on.
• Whether it is used to stop an attack or help conduct one.
• Whether Australian commanders retain control over the mission.

These are not merely technical matters.

They determine whether Australia remains a defensive partner or becomes a participant in a wider conflict.

Could Australia be asked to do more?

Yes.

If the conflict expanded, Australia could receive requests from the United States, Britain, Gulf governments or other partners for additional assistance.

Those requests might include:

• More surveillance aircraft.
• Air-defence equipment.
• Intelligence support.
• Refuelling or transport aircraft.
• Naval protection for commercial shipping.
• Assistance evacuating Australian citizens.
• Additional personnel to protect Australian facilities.

Australia would not be automatically required to agree to every request.

Each decision would be made by the federal government, taking into account Australia’s alliances, national interests, military capacity and the risks to ADF personnel.

The United States alliance is central to Australian defence policy, but it does not mean that Australia must participate in every American military operation.

The government initially ruled out joining offensive military action against Iran while maintaining precautionary measures for Australian personnel already stationed in the region.

Whether that position could be maintained during a prolonged regional war would depend on the circumstances.

The Strait of Hormuz matters to Australia

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea.

A substantial share of the world’s traded oil and liquefied natural gas passes through or near it.

Australia is geographically distant, but it is economically exposed.

Disruption to shipping through the strait can affect:

• Global oil prices.
• Australian petrol and diesel prices.
• Aviation fuel costs.
• Shipping and freight charges.
• Insurance premiums.
• Supply chains.
• Inflation.

Recent fighting and threats to shipping have again placed freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz at the centre of the conflict.

This creates one possible pathway to a larger Australian military role.

Australia could be asked to contribute a naval vessel to an international mission protecting merchant shipping or keeping sea lanes open.

Such a deployment might be described as protecting international trade rather than fighting Iran.

However, a warship confronting Iranian vessels, missiles or drones would still be operating in a dangerous and potentially hostile environment.

Australian citizens are another consideration

The government must also consider the large number of Australians who live, work or travel in the Middle East.

During earlier stages of the conflict, airspace closures and cancelled flights complicated efforts to assist Australians seeking to leave the region.

The ADF has previously deployed aircraft and personnel under Operation Beech to support possible assisted departures of Australian citizens and approved foreign nationals.

If commercial air travel were again severely disrupted, Defence could be called upon to assist evacuations.

That would place Australian aircraft and personnel close to an active conflict while airports, roads and airspace were under pressure.

What would escalation mean for ADF families?

Military deployments are often discussed in terms of aircraft, missiles and strategy.

Behind every deployment are Australian servicemen and women and their families.

A mission initially described as limited and defensive can become longer and more dangerous as circumstances change.

Families deserve clear information about:

• Where Australian personnel are operating.
• The purpose of the deployment.
• The risks they face.
• The rules governing their mission.
• Whether the deployment has been expanded.
• How long they are expected to remain.

Operational security will prevent the government from releasing every detail.

That does not remove the need for public accountability.

Australians should be told when the nature of a mission changes.

Is Australia at war with Iran?

The government’s position has been that Australia is not participating in offensive military operations against Iran.

That is an important political statement, but the legal and strategic position may be more complicated.

Australian personnel are helping defend countries being attacked by Iranian weapons. Their aircraft contribute directly to identifying threats and enabling defensive responses.

Some legal observers have therefore argued that Australia may no longer be a complete bystander, even though it is not conducting attacks inside Iran.

The answer may depend on what is meant by the word “war”.

Australia is not pursuing regime change in Tehran. It has not announced a campaign against Iran. Australian forces are not known to be bombing Iranian territory.

But Australian military personnel are operating inside a conflict zone and assisting countries defending themselves against Iranian attacks.

That is a significant commitment, regardless of the terminology used.

What Australians should watch

The most important signs of a changing Australian role would include:

• An extension or enlargement of the Wedgetail deployment.
• Additional ADF personnel being sent to the Gulf.
• Deployment of an Australian warship.
• Broader intelligence-sharing arrangements.
• Australian support for operations near the Strait of Hormuz.
• Changes to the government’s description of the mission.
• Any Australian casualties or attacks on facilities housing ADF personnel.

None of these outcomes should be assumed.

They are nevertheless the points at which a limited defensive mission could begin to take on a broader strategic character.

The Times View

Australia has legitimate interests in preventing missile attacks, protecting its citizens and maintaining the safe movement of international shipping.

It also has an obligation to be honest about the risks carried by Australian personnel.

Calling a deployment defensive does not make it safe. Nor does it mean the mission cannot expand as events change.

The government must continue to define the boundaries of Australia’s involvement clearly.

Australians should know why their Defence personnel are in the Middle East, what they are authorised to do and what circumstances could lead to a larger commitment.

Military missions are easiest to understand when they begin.

The real test of accountability comes when the conflict changes and the mission begins to change with it.