World

Mon Mar 30

Yes, China has made inroads in the Pacific, but Australia still does far more

Written by Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, Adelaide University

Last year, Australia was reminded of China’s willingness to exercise its growing naval power in the region. In February, a Chinese flotilla circumnavigated the country ^[1] and conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea.

And in November, a powerful Chinese task group came within a few kilometres of Australia’s maritime territory ^[2].

These events also highlighted the continued importance of Australia’s relationship with its Pacific neighbours and their maritime security. In fact, several Pacific Island countries worked with Australia ^[3] to monitor the Chinese task group as it passed their territories.

Australia has been accused of “neglect” and “stupor”^[4] when it comes to the Pacific. Some even claim Australia has “lost ^[5]” the Pacific to China.

But these observations overlook the sophisticated ways the Pacific countries decide who they will partner with ^[6].

While there is always room for improvement ^[7], Australia does a lot more than China in the Pacific. This is demonstrated by five maps from a project we are conducting ^[8] to examine Pacific maritime security cooperation.

Australian assistance in fisheries and security

As our mapping illustrates ^[9], both Australia and New Zealand are members of all major Pacific institutions. This includes the region’s preeminent political and security institution, the Pacific Islands Forum ^[10]. China is not.

However, as the largest financial contributor to these institutions, as well as a major aid donor, Australia has been criticised for seeking to exert undue influence ^[11] on them. And, though Australia has supported important initiatives such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone ^[12], it has been accused of stymieing collective commitments to address climate change ^[13].

Australia should be mindful to use its seat at the table carefully.

For most Pacific Island countries, fisheries are an important source of revenue. And our mapping illustrates ^[14] the significant role Australia plays in this industry. For example, many Australians work within the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency ^[15], the peak regional body that manages Pacific fisheries. China does not have personnel working there.

In addition, the Pacific Maritime Security Program ^[16] is providing 24 new patrol boats, three landing craft, and a small loan fleet of other boats to 15 Pacific countries. This helps them counter illegal fishing, transnational crime and other threats.

Australia is also helping to upgrade wharf infrastructure in 13 countries.

This support is bolstered by Australia’s longstanding Defence Cooperation Program ^[17], which has been providing assistance to bolster Pacific defence capabilities since the 1960s.

And, as our mapping shows ^[18], Australia has helped to redevelop the Blackrock Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp ^[19] in Fiji, the Lombrum Naval Base ^[20] in PNG, and the Cook Barracks and Tiroas Barracks ^[21] in Vanuatu, among other projects.

Transnational crime is a growing concern in the Pacific ^[22], particularly the drugs trade and online scam operations. Both Chinese ^[23] and Australian ^[24] criminal networks are guilty of fuelling it.

However, as our mapping demonstrates ^[25], Australia is a member of several major regional response agencies. Again, China is not.

Chinese infrastructure projects and security deals

China has funded some port infrastructure ^[26] in the Pacific, including the Luganville wharf in Vanuatu. That development generated anxiety in Australia. Some claimed it could be converted into a Chinese naval base ^[27].

But these claims are seldom tested ^[28].

Any Chinese military base in the region would be extremely vulnerable. If a conflict were to break out, this would be the first thing that Australia – and its American allies – would target.

A military base would also likely be unpopular with locals ^[29] and difficult and expensive ^[30] to maintain from a supply and logistics perspective.

The strategic value of a Chinese military base would be questionable, too. China could make Australia feel vulnerable in other ways, such as periodically sending its warships into Australian waters.

In 2022, China signed a security agreement with Solomon Islands, generating much anxiety in Australia ^[31]. But as our mapping illustrates ^[32], Australia has a number of similar treaties and arrangements with Pacific countries.

Although we have argued it would be preferable for Australia to prioritise ^[33] regional security approaches over bilateral agreements, there is no denying Canberra has achieved remarkable success in this area.

The US and France ^[34] also have territories and bases across the Pacific. So, there aren’t many places for China to establish a military foothold – if it even wanted one.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

In addition, Australia has long been the main provider of humanitarian and disaster relief in the region ^[35], and is a member of several disaster response initiatives ^[36].

It is also the largest donor ^[37] to the Pacific Resilience Facility ^[38], which will fund climate change and disaster resilience projects across the region.

In 2024, Pacific defence ministers endorsed ^[39] Australia’s proposal for a Pacific Response Group, which will facilitate joint military deployments ^[40] to respond to disasters. While there were questions about whether the group has adequate regional buy-in and would meet the needs ^[41] of Pacific countries, this kind of assistance is often welcomed.

China has no similar seat at important regional tables. It has founded alternative Pacific disaster response ^[42] and risk reduction ^[43] groups, but they are based in China.

All is not lost

Given China’s recent demonstrations of its naval muscle, it’s understandable why the Albanese government is cautious about its rising influence. Foreign Minister Penny Wong has called it a “permanent state of contest ^[44]” with China over the Pacific.

But our mapping is a reminder of the dangers of viewing China’s inroads in absolute terms ^[45], not relative to what Australia and other partners can offer.

Beyond New Zealand, no other country is as embedded as Australia in the national and regional institutions of Pacific Islands countries. And the shifting global order only reinforces the importance of Australia maintaining these strong relationships with its neighbours ^[46].