As he looks to solidify his territorial gains in Ukraine in a potential ceasefire deal, Russian President Vladimir Putin has one eye trained on Russia’s southern border – and boosting Russian influence in Central Asia.

Following his 2024 re-election, Putin made Uzbekistan his third foreign visit^[1] after China and Belarus. The visit signalled the region’s continued importance to Moscow.

In response to Western sanctions on Moscow over the Ukraine war, trade and investment between Russia and Central Asian countries have grown significantly.

Russia’s Lukoil and Gazprom are now the dominant foreign players in Uzbekistan’s energy fields^[2]. In Kazakhstan, Moscow controls a quarter of the country’s uranium production.

But as Russia tries to reaffirm its role in the region, China has also been quietly expanding its influence.

Could this growing competition over Central Asia affect Beijing and Moscow’s broader relationship?

Central Asia drifting apart from Moscow

The Central Asian region is home to approximately 79 million people spread across five nations. It was part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Its strategic location between Russia and China, on the doorstep of the Middle East, has long made it a “grand chessboard^[3]” for great power politics.

While Russia has traditionally dominated the region, Central Asian leaders have made efforts to somewhat distance themselves from Moscow recently.

At the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in October 2022, for example, Tajikistan’s president publicly challenged Russian President Vladimir Putin^[4]. He demanded respect for smaller states like his.

Similarly, during Putin’s 2023 visit to Kazakhstan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made a symbolic statement at the press conference by delivering his speech in Kazakh rather than Russian^[5]. This was a rare move that seemed to catch Putin’s delegation off guard.

In another striking moment, Tokayev declared at an economic forum in Russia in 2022 that Kazakhstan does not recognise Russia’s “quasi-states”, referring to its occupied territories of Ukraine^[6].

Yet, all Central Asian states remain part of at least one Russia-led organisation, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or the Eurasian Economic Union.

Three states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) rely on Russian security guarantees through the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

And the region’s economic dependency on Russia remains significant. Of the 6.1 million migrants in Russia, the largest groups come from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan^[7]. These countries depend heavily on remittances from these migrant workers.

China’s growing influence

With Russia preoccupied with Ukraine and constrained by Western sanctions, China has seized the opportunity to deepen its engagement in the region.

Beijing’s involvement in Central Asia has long been economic. In 2013, for instance, China unveiled its ambitious, global Belt and Road Initiative^[8] in Kazakhstan. And by 2024, it was China, not Russia, that was the largest trading partner of every Central Asian country except Tajikistan.

But in recent years, China has expanded its influence beyond economic ties, establishing itself as a key player in regional politics.

At the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit^[9] in 2023, for example, Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged support for the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the region. This is traditionally a role played by Russia.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stands with Central Asian leaders at the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi'an, China, in 2023. Florence Lo/Reuters pool/EPA

Xi has also been making high-profile visits^[10] to Central Asian states, signalling Beijing’s growing strategic interests here.

Local populations, however, remain wary. Public opinion surveys indicate^[11] China is viewed more negatively than Russia.

Many Chinese-funded projects bring their own workers, limiting job opportunities for locals and fuelling resentment. There is also anxiety about potential “debt trap” diplomacy. Civil society groups have called for economic diversification to avoid over-reliance on Beijing^[12].

Further complicating matters is Beijing’s treatment of the Muslim minority Uyghur population in the Xinjiang region of western China. This has reinforced suspicions in Muslim-majority Central Asia about China’s long-term intentions in the region.

Growing competition

The increasing competition raises questions about the potential impact on the broader, “no limits^[13]” relationship between Moscow and Beijing.

At a recent forum, Putin acknowledged Beijing’s growing economic role in the region. However, he insisted Russia still has “special ties” with Central Asian states, rooted in history. And he notably dismissed concerns about China’s expansionist aims, saying^[14]:

There is nothing about domination in the Chinese philosophy. They do not strive for domination.

On the ground, however, things aren’t so simple. So far, China and Russia have managed to avoid stepping on each other’s toes. How long that balance remains, however, is an open question.

Central Asian countries, meanwhile, are courting both sides – and diversifying their ties beyond the two powers.

Many of the region’s educated elite are increasingly looking toward Turkey – and pan-Turkic solidarity^[15] – as an alternative to both Russian and Chinese dominance.

Russia’s historical influence in the region remains strong. But the days of its unquestioned dominance appear to be over.

Russia may try to reassert its preeminent position, but China’s deepening economic presence is not going anywhere.

With both countries pushing their own regional agendas, it’s hard to ignore the overlap – and the potential for a future clash over competing interests.

References

1. ^{^} Uzbekistan his third foreign visit (www.voanews.com)
2. ^{^} foreign players in Uzbekistan’s energy fields (www.chathamhouse.org)
3. ^{^} grand chessboard (shs.hal.science)
4. ^{^} publicly challenged Russian President Vladimir Putin (www.rferl.org)
5. ^{^} by delivering his speech in Kazakh rather than Russian (eurasianet.org)
6. ^{^} referring to its occupied territories of Ukraine (www.aljazeera.com)
7. ^{^} largest groups come from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (www.kommersant.ru)
8. ^{^} Belt and Road Initiative (astanatimes.com)
9. ^{^} China-Central Asia Summit (astanatimes.com)
10. ^{^} high-profile visits (www.theguardian.com)
11. ^{^} Public opinion surveys indicate (thediplomat.com)
12. ^{^} economic diversification to avoid over-reliance on Beijing (www.youtube.com)
13. ^{^} no limits (www.voanews.com)
14. ^{^} saying (www.en.kremlin.ru)
15. ^{^} pan-Turkic solidarity (www.ieg-ego.eu)