Cooler heads must prevail with Trump – Australia shouldn’t give up on the ‘special friendship’
- Written by John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
US President Donald Trump appears to have abruptly upended America’s most trusted alliances with European countries since taking office just two months ago. But are we misreading the cues?
In addition to putting pressure[1] on Ukraine to secure a deal to end the war, he has suggested[2] the US may no longer honour its commitment to protect NATO[3] allies that aren’t meeting the bloc’s guideline of spending at least 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence spending.
These tough tactics have had some results. European countries have committed to spending beyond 2%[4], as Trump has demanded. And his drastic positions on Ukraine have suddenly been reversed. The horsetrading over what this means for NATO isn’t over yet, but Trump’s resourcefulness in this second term should not be underestimated.
A top Pentagon official is now calling on Australia to similarly increase its defence spending[5] from 2% to 3% of GDP.
Australia has not managed to avoid Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminium, although this accounts for a small fraction[6] of its output and international trade – and no allies have been exempt from his tariffs. Other countries have chosen to retaliate, but Australia would be wise not to do so[7].
Should Trump’s recent actions, however, make Canberra worry about his commitment to the broader US-Australia alliance?
Emotional reactions over Trump should be avoided. There’s no real reason to fear a potential alliance abandonment. The US and Australia have plenty of compelling, enduring and overlapping interests that make a Trump about-face unlikely.
Deep, mutual ties
Those inclined to be critical of the US alliance and the AUKUS agreement have barked loudly[8] about Trump’s recent actions. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in particular, has warned of Australian leaders being part of a “conga line of sycophants[9]” paying homage to Trump and not being more forthright in their criticism of his policy decisions.
Others have declared “the special friendship is over[10]” and called for a drastically more independent Australian foreign and defence policy[11]. This is premature and counter-productive.
Turnbull is arguably trying to shame Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Opposition Leader Peter Dutton into following his lead and challenging Trump more forcefully. But how would that help with a man who evidently revels in escalating tensions?
There is a clear need to put emotional reactions to the side and weigh Australia’s national interests dispassionately.
Australia is heavily invested in the United States for its security and wellbeing. The AUKUS agreement alone will see Australia spending A$368 billion[12] in the coming decades on nuclear-powered submarines.
Australia is also hugely invested in American defence technology across the sea, air, land, space and cyber domains. Overall, Australia has invested over A$1 trillion[13] in the US – by far its largest destination for overseas investment.
The US, in turn, has a demonstrated interest in having a bigger security presence in the Indo-Pacific region in a way that might even improve great power relations[14]. And as defence expert Des Ball once said, Australia is a “suitable piece of real estate[15]” to accommodate this increased presence.
Australia already hosts shared intelligence facilities at Pine Gap, US Marine Corps facilities in Darwin and shared submarine facilities near Perth. Jointly funded upgrades[16] of the Tindal air base will soon accommodate American B-52 bombers, too.
Washington is also heavily invested in Australia. The US is the biggest foreign direct investor[17] in Australia by a country mile – and also enjoys a trade surplus[18] with Australia.
Boosting regional ties
With so much in flux, though, Australia does need to increase its defence spending.
Australia’s boutique force, structured as it was for the unipolar moment, when the world was dominated by one power (its ally, the US), is no longer fit for purpose. It needs to muscle up, and quickly. A scheme for national and community service[19] would help.
Indeed, what most critics are calling for reflects many of the arguments made in the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 2017[20], written when Trump last came to office. I describe this as Australia’s “Plan B”[21]. It was not dismissive of the US alliance, but looked to mitigate the risks associated with a more transactional and less predictable US leadership.
More can be done, though. Australia should also look to bolster its diplomatic, security and economic[22] cooperation with regional partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
As part of this, Australia should avoid cutting its aid to the region[23] and offer better options to Pacific partners – what I have called a “grand compact[24]” with Pacific Island states, or even a Pacific federation.
In addition, more security and development cooperation is needed with nations further afield, such as Japan[25], India[26] and South Korea[27].
We should avoid making upfront commitments to a land war in Asia or Europe, though. We have only recently recovered from the setback in regional defence relations from the distraction of the distant, US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq[28].
We need to muscle up, yes. But let’s not think we can make much of a difference on the ground as part of a peacekeeping force for Ukraine[29]. It’s best to support Ukraine with resources from afar and remain focused on bolstering regional ties.
The danger of overreacting
Pundits are also questioning whether the US can still be counted on[30] in regional long-term defence and security planning.
I contend we are in danger of overreacting to the early moves of a presidency in a hurry to make significant changes. Rather than the sky falling in, we are in the midst of a storm.
It is not pretty. But we should wait for the dust to settle.
We also should recognise the limits of Australian power, authority and reach when it comes to influencing US behaviour. We have tended to be a middle power without large-power pretensions. We no doubt can do more to stand up for ourselves, but let’s not get ahead of ourselves in terms of what this means for the relationship with Washington.
Trump evidently sees the world as “multipolar”, meaning a world dominated by several powers, notably the US, China and Russia.
While comparisons between Trump’s interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Franklin D Roosevelt’s wartime dealings[31] with Joseph Stalin are flattering to the US president, they aren’t as far-fetched as some critics would claim. They reflect a hyper-realist and transactional approach to foreign policy, where (to quote Thucydides[32]) “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.
While Trump advances such an approach to international relations, it is important to remember how invested the US and Australia are in one another.
Like Australia, the US is a continent-spanning, federal, cosmopolitan, English-speaking, New World, common-law, free-market, bicameral, constitutional and broadly still liberal democracy. We still talk about “shared values” because of these persistent overlaps. And these overlaps have driven the alignment of these two countries’ priorities for generations.
In Trump’s new, transactional and multipolar world view, the US needs Australia more than it needs Europe. (Though, it should be noted, despite Trump’s tough words for Europe, the US still has more than 100,000 US military personnel there[33].)
Over the longer term, Australia’s unique geography and shared history mean it matters in the great game of containing its main competitor, China, from dominating East Asia and the Pacific[34].
This is an enduring American interest and a longstanding Australian concern. Australia, therefore, will continue to be a Pacific partner. The deterrent effect from this solidarity remains the best bet to help prevent the outbreak of another war in the Pacific.
Correction: This piece has been amended to say Australia has invested over A$1 trillion in the US overall, not per year.
References
- ^ putting pressure (abcnews.go.com)
- ^ suggested (www.nbcnews.com)
- ^ NATO (www.nato.int)
- ^ European countries have committed to spending beyond 2% (www.bbc.co.uk)
- ^ increase its defence spending (www.smh.com.au)
- ^ small fraction (theconversation.com)
- ^ wise not to do so (www.msn.com)
- ^ barked loudly (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ conga line of sycophants (www.afr.com)
- ^ the special friendship is over (www.smh.com.au)
- ^ more independent Australian foreign and defence policy (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ A$368 billion (www.afr.com)
- ^ A$1 trillion (www.dfat.gov.au)
- ^ might even improve great power relations (foreignpolicy.com)
- ^ suitable piece of real estate (www.amazon.com.au)
- ^ Jointly funded upgrades (www.theaustralian.com.au)
- ^ biggest foreign direct investor (www.state.gov)
- ^ enjoys a trade surplus (www.ussc.edu.au)
- ^ scheme for national and community service (www.policyforum.net)
- ^ Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 2017 (www.dfat.gov.au)
- ^ Australia’s “Plan B” (www.aspistrategist.org.au)
- ^ bolster its diplomatic, security and economic (www.academia.edu)
- ^ avoid cutting its aid to the region (www.aspistrategist.org.au)
- ^ grand compact (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ Japan (www.dfat.gov.au)
- ^ India (www.mea.gov.in)
- ^ South Korea (www.dfat.gov.au)
- ^ Afghanistan and Iraq (press.anu.edu.au)
- ^ peacekeeping force for Ukraine (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ can still be counted on (www.smh.com.au)
- ^ wartime dealings (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ quote Thucydides (theconversation.com)
- ^ 100,000 US military personnel there (www.bbc.com)
- ^ from dominating East Asia and the Pacific (thestrategybridge.org)
