Wed Nov 22

Why the US and its partners cannot afford to go soft on support for Ukraine now

Written by Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National University

In recent weeks, US President Joe Biden has boldly referred to the United States as the world’s “indispensable nation ^[1]”.

But when the term was first coined – by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ^[2] in the 1990s – the world was a markedly different place. The Cold War had just ended, with America victorious. It faced no peer competitors, or even the prospect of one on the horizon. The events of 9/11 were yet to occur.

In short, American leadership of the global order seemed not only assured, but also likely to endure for the foreseeable future.

Today, though, claims about both the necessity and capacity of the US to provide global leadership are increasingly being put to the test. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East – in addition to its ongoing competition with China – are jostling for US attention and its resources.

At a time when Republican Party infighting ^[3] has brought the US government itself close to paralysis, there is a looming sense the US will struggle to provide the type of blanket world leadership ^[4] – and the assurance that comes with it – in the way it has done previously.

It’s therefore not surprising that another round of commentary ^[5] has emerged about the need for the US to pressure Ukraine to accept a peace deal.

Why fatigue is setting in on Ukraine

This seems counterintuitive for a couple of reasons. For one thing, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has no incentive to negotiate a peace deal – nor does Russian President Vladimir Putin, for that matter.

In addition, the Biden administration has consistently reaffirmed its commitment ^[6] to supply Ukraine with military, economic and humanitarian aid – even though Kyiv continues to chafe at American reticence ^[7] to provide it with weapons that might prove more decisive on the battlefield.

However, Ukraine is seen as potentially low-hanging fruit for those seeking to unburden the US from the many demands on its time and money. This mainly consists of conservative Republicans in Congress and right-wing national security think tanks.

There are several arguments put forth by this camp. Crucially, Ukraine’s anticipated counteroffensive against Russian forces has thus far failed to yield a decisive breakthrough. Zelensky, himself, has grudgingly admitted ^[8] this some months ago.

Moreover, the US isn’t obliged to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression because it isn’t a NATO member. And a number of prominent conservative American strategists, especially those with ties to the former Trump administration ^[9], have loudly called Ukraine a distraction from the United States’ main strategic contest with China.

Indeed, holding military aid for Ukraine hostage to Republican Party politics was the explicit goal of a small number of maverick Congress members who united to oust ^[10] former Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in October.

The evangelical conservative Mike Reynolds, McCarthy’s eventual successor as speaker, oversaw the passage of a US$14.5 billion (A$22.2 billion) aid package ^[11] for Israel earlier this month. However, he would only countenance further assistance for Kyiv if the Biden administration capitulated to Republican demands for more funding to secure US borders.

Kyiv has become so concerned about the holdups in war funding from the US, in fact, it dispatched ^[12] Andriy Yermak, head of the presidential office, to Washington last week to rally support.

Europeans stepping up support

Perhaps recognising Washington’s international and domestic woes, the German government has pledged to double its military aid ^[14] for Ukraine from €4 billion to €8 billion euros (A$6.6 billion to A$13.3 billion) in 2024.

Additional European funding is also available for Ukrainian security assistance via the European Union Peace Facility ^[15], which had its financial ceiling increased to over €12 billion (A$20 billion) this year.

Yet, there is also a fly in the ointment. The right-wing Hungarian ^[16] government led by Viktor Orban has insisted it will hold up releasing these funds until Hungarian banks (which continue to deal with Russia) are guaranteed not to be blacklisted by the EU as “sponsors of war”.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, held talks in Kyiv earlier this month. Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA

Why the West can’t drop Ukraine now

Letting Ukraine drop off the West’s radar would be an error of historic significance. For one thing, fractures within Ukraine’s Western democratic supporters are precisely what Putin is counting on.

The Kremlin calculation here is simple: Russia’s advantages over Ukraine in size and cannon fodder mean it should be able to continue its war ^[17] for years. And Moscow believes the West (as Ukraine’s main arms and aid backers) will at some point lose interest and push Kyiv to sue for peace.

More worryingly, if the US elections in 2024 produce a Trump administration 2.0, it will be springtime for dictators like Putin.

It’s already clear, for instance, the far right in the US is drawing up plans for Trump loyalists ^[19] to be installed in all branches of the security agencies should he win the election.

A second Trump presidency is, therefore, likely to be far less constrained by US institutional checks and balances than the first, especially given there is now a GOP-compliant Supreme Court. It will also have an appetite for weeding out domestic enemies of the regime (whom Trump recently called “vermin”^[20]). As a result, we can assume it will be apathetic about any expectations around US global leadership.

But even without a Trump victory in 2024, going soft on Ukraine sends the message the West’s much-vaunted values and respect for rules are little more than rhetoric. It will also legitimise conquest as an option that not only goes unpunished, but is tacitly rewarded if those who engage in it are not held to account.

More broadly, a US capitulation on Ukraine would set a chilling precedent that would badly tarnish US credibility in Japan, Australia, Taiwan and other US partners in the Asia-Pacific. What good is there, these nations will justifiably ask, in an “indispensable nation” if it cannot be counted on during times of crisis?

Perhaps instead of indulging in self-congratulatory labels, it might be wise for US leaders to remember that being indispensable – like beauty – is in the eye of the beholder.